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For the past 35 years I have been practicing in, teaching, and writing about the Family 
Court. The problem-solving court movement in the last two decades – with its proliferation of 
drug courts, mental health courts, and veterans courts, to name a few – renewed my interest in 
the historical roots of the family court because of the parallels between the original juvenile court 
and the recent problem solving court movement. One of the key elements—perhaps the defining 
element—in both is the role of the judge as the leader of the court.  That is what I want to focus 
on today.  I’ve called this talk a cautionary tale; what I mean is that the idea of judicial leadership 
as it developed in the juvenile and family court historically, and as it is still being applied in 
those courts and in the newer problem solving courts today, is based on an idealized conception 
of the judge that has never been true and is unlikely ever to be true.   Consequently, building a 
court around this idealized notion of the judicial leader is a dangerous proposition. 
 We’ll begin with the words of a contemporary family court leader. Judge Leonard 
Edwards received the 2004 William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence, bestowed each 
year by the National Center for State Courts to a state court judge who “exemplifies the highest 
level of judicial excellence, integrity, fairness, and professional ethics.”1 Judge Edwards, a 
distinguished and dedicated family court judge from California, is the first and only juvenile or 
family court judge to receive the award, a testament to his national leadership on behalf of these 
courts.  Here are his words: 
 
Judges in the juvenile court are charged with keeping children safe; 
restoring families; finding permanency for children; and holding 
youth, families, and service providers accountable . . . We have to 
convene child- and family-serving agencies, schools, and the 
community around the problems facing our most vulnerable and 
troubled children . . . The role of the juvenile court judge is unlike 
any other. In the traditional judicial role, deciding a legal issue 
may complete the judge’s task; however, in deciding the future of a 
child or family member, the juvenile court judge must, in addition 
to making a legal decision, be prepared to take on the role of an 
administrator, a collaborator, a convener, and an advocate.2 
                                                
* Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank the faculty, staff , 
and students of the University of Tennesse College of Law for their warm welcome last April to Knoxville, 
especially Professors Wendy Bach and Valerie Vojdik for inviting me, Professor Penny White for asking to publish 
this lecture, and Dean Doug Blaze for facilitating such interesting conversations during my visit.  
 
1 Leonard P. Edwards, Remarks of Judge Edward P. Leonards at the Presentation of the William H. Rehnquist 
Award for Judicial Excellence (Nov. 18, 2004), in 5 J. CENTER FAM. CHILDREN & CTS. 169, 169 (2004). 
2 Id. at 170. 
 
 Judge Edwards is proud that the family court judge is not limited to the traditional judicial role 
of legal decision-maker, but instead given broad responsibility for children and families, which 
requires each judge to be an administrator, collaborator, convener and advocate.  Judge Edwards’ 
award was presented in the Great Hall of the United States Supreme Court and Judge Edwards 
took the opportunity to remind his august audience of the critical work done by his colleagues 
throughout the country while also lamenting how infrequently the Court has acknowledged that 
work. Judge Edwards carefully sidesteps the severe chastisement that the Court had delivered in 
several of its most famous juvenile cases, such as In re Gault and Mckeiver v. Pennsylvania, 
where the Court criticized the work of many of his colleagues as it struggled to define the proper 
role of the juvenile court judge, expressing uncertainty whether the multiplicity of roles that 
Judge Edwards heralds can be filled by the mere mortals who become family court judges.   
These multiple roles are a departure from the impartial, restrained and objective judge in 
the common law tradition and shift judicial responsibility from individualized legal 
determinations to a broader conception of judicial leadership.  As the ultimate authority in the 
courtroom, judges in all trial courts today assume a leadership role to make sure the case moves 
along expeditiously, that due process protections are upheld, and that everyone in the courtroom 
is doing his or her job.  Professor Judith Resnik calls this modern decision-maker the 
“managerial judge.”3  The family court judge, however, is given a different managerial role.  As 
defined in the New York Family Court Act, the family court judge is given “a wide range of 
powers for dealing with the complexities of family life so that its action may fit the particular 
needs of those before it.”4  
As the myriad proceedings concerning families have become increasingly consolidated 
into a single court system – a unified family court in many states – the role of the judge as the 
leader inside and outside the courtroom has intensified. The trajectory toward unification and 
greater judicial authority over all aspects of family conflict within a single judicial decision-
maker raises significant questions about the ability of the judge to balance his or her ability to 
make impartial and fair determinations while using the extensive discretion granted to the court 
to “fit the particular needs of those before it.”5  The family court unification movement, which 
began in earnest in the middle of the twentieth century and continues today, is the most 
important development since the juvenile court’s creation.  The movement, however, has resisted 
the historical lessons of judicial leadership in its predecessor courts, which provide a cautionary 
tale against consolidating too much power in one judge.  Even in Tennessee, where a unified 
system has not been adopted, juvenile court jurisdiction extends to dependency, status offenses, 
delinquency, custody, termination of parental rights, paternity, support and other related issues.  
Without unification, judges with juvenile court jurisdiction here have tremendous authority over 
the intersecting issues that bring families before them.  Later, I will distinguish between the 
administrative advantages of unification and the disadvantages of situating too much power 
within a single decision-maker.  First, let us look at the similarities between Judge Edwards’ 
description of his role and the words used by of some of the founders of the juvenile court to 
understand better the historical underpinnings of the judge’s role. 
In his remarks Judge Edwards said: “We are the legal equivalent of an emergency room 
in the medical profession.  We intervene in crises and figure out the best response on a case-by-
                                                
3Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
4 N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 141 (McKinney 2008). 
5 Id. 
case, individualized basis.”6  At the beginning of the 20th century, juvenile court judges were 
similarly described as “doctor-counselors” or “judicial therapists” who “[are] specialists in the 
art of human relations.”7  The judge’s task was to “get the whole truth about a child” like “a 
physician searches for every detail that bears on the condition of a patient.”8  The medical 
metaphor is in stark contrast to a judge who is being asked to determine whether a child 
committed a crime or a parent is neglectful.  Those determinations rely on evidence of acts and 
intent rather than what the best response to those acts might be.  Judge Harvey Humphrey Baker, 
the first judge of the Boston juvenile court, uses  medical metaphors to explain why the juvenile 
court doesn’t “confine its attention to just the particular offense which brought the child to its 
notice.”9  Judge Baker believed “it is helpful to think of [court officials] as physicians in a 
dispensary,”10 referring to both the physical arrangement of a juvenile court but also to the way 
in which the court conducts its business: 
 
In determining the disposition to be made of the case the procedure 
of the physician is very closely followed . . . The judge and 
probation officer consider together, like a physician and his junior, 
whether the outbreak which resulted in the arrest of the child was 
largely accidental, or whether it is habitual or likely to be so; 
whether it is due chiefly to some inherent physical or moral defect 
of the child, or whether some feature of his environment is an 
important factor; and then they address themselves to the question 
of how permanently to prevent the recurrence.11 
 
Even Judge Baker knew the limitations of the analogy, recognizing that a child did not come 
voluntarily to the court as a patient comes to a dispensary.  And while a doctor may have a duty 
to minimize pain, the judge and probation officer “from time to time deliberately cause the child 
discomfort, because the discomfort of punishment affords in some cases an indispensible 
stimulus or moral tonic which cannot be supplied in any other way.”12  
This medical metaphor does not fit well into the common law tradition where the judge’s 
“sole duty is to determine under the law and the facts the questions presented.”13 Some judges at 
the time suggested that the juvenile court seemed better suited to the investigative tradition of 
civil law countries.14  Judge Willis B. Perkins, a prosecutor and later a Michigan Circuit judge 
early in the 20th Century, urged adoption of the inquisitorial tradition of the civil law courts of 
continental Europe to allow the judge to scrutinize deeply into the family’s life.  Judge Perkins 
said:  
 
                                                
6 Edwards, supra note 150 at 170. 
7 Anthony M. Platt, THE CHILD SAVERS 142 (1969). 
8 Id. at 142-43. 
9 Harvey H. Baker, The Procedure of the Boston Juvenile Court, in HARVEY HUMPHREY BAKER, UPBUILDER OF THE 
JUVENILE COURT 114 (1910). 
10 Id. at 109. 
11 Id. at 114. 
12 Id. at 116. 
13 Willis B. Perkins, Family Courts, 17 MICH. L. REV. 378, 380 (1919). 
14 Id. 
The judge of a family court must have larger powers than these. He 
must be at liberty to investigate or cause to be investigated every 
anti-social or abnormal act growing out of family disturbances. His 
duties must necessarily be inquisitorial rather than accusatory . . . 
To empower a judge to act on his own initiative immediately and 
without pleadings; to authorize him to become the general 
supervisor and mentor of the home and its several occupants, will 
be a new thing in our jurisprudence.15  
 
Judge Perkins was nevertheless concerned that society would not tolerate these “tyrannical 
methods unless they are fruitful of good results,” so he set the standard for this new kind of 
judicial officer very high:  
 
It is apparent, therefore, that a judge who is given these 
extraordinary powers must be a man well versed in the law, of 
large experience, unswerving firmness, broad sympathies, and 
clear, quick and accurate judgments. Wanting in any of these 
elements, his work must fail.16 
 
The tension between setting extraordinary high standards for judges implementing this 
foreign, even tyrannical, process and worrying that they will fail to meet those standards 
pervades the history of the court.  
Julian W. Mack, a founder of the juvenile court and one of its most famous jurists, put it 
this way:  
 
I know – and the other judges have told me the same thing –that 
the good people of the community think that every judge of the 
juvenile court must necessarily be a fine fellow, filled with the 
wisdom of the ages, capable of dealing with all the children that 
come before him.17  
 
Like Judge Edwards nearly a century later, Judge Mack conceived: 
 
[T]he duty of the juvenile court judge [is] to go out into his 
community, if not into the larger community of the country at 
large, and stimulate and arouse the people to a sense of their 
obligation to the wards who come into his immediate care, as it is 
to sit daily on his bench and deal with those individual children.18  
 
Both Judge Mack and Judge Edwards fulfilled those duties, lecturing widely, writing about their 
experiences, sitting on local and national commissions and serving as models of great jurists.  
                                                
15 Id. at 381. 
16 Id. 
17 Julian W. Mack, The Chancery Procedure in Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 313 
(1925). 
18 Id. at 316. 
With hindsight, Judge Mack admits that this fine fellow is less perfect than the community 
thought:  
 
That sort of a genius does not exist. He may in the course of time, 
through unusual experience and opportunity, gain considerable 
wisdom . . . But few judges are really temperamentally fitted, and 
few are so eminently endowed as to be able to do the juvenile work 
and the probation work and all the other work that must be done if 
the court is to be really successful.19 
 
Judge Mack made this observation only twenty-five years after the juvenile court was 
founded and only a few years after Judge Perkins’ comparable reflection.  Yet, the narrative of 
this extraordinary judicial creature is undiminished in Judge Edwards’ remarks almost a century 
later.  This may be, in part, because Judge Edwards embraces a version of the judge who is 
rightly more constrained by statutory limitations and constitutional due process protections today 
and therefore not quite the same “fine fellow” the early court employed.20  Even so, the judge’s 
role as a leader continues to define the court today, even as the medicalized juvenile court 
evolved into a family court more tethered to the law.  This evolution began in earnest in the 
middle of the 20th Century.  I would like to use the example of creating the unified family court 
in New York to illustrate the enduring power of judicial leadership 50 years after the juvenile 
court was founded before turning to its enduring power today.   
 In 1953, Alfred Kahn published what was called a “controversial and provocative” report, 
A Court for Children, about the New York City Children’s Court.21  Dr. Kahn received the first 
doctorate in social welfare issued in New York State by writing a dissertation that would later 
become this report.  He taught at the Columbia School of Social Work for 57 years and became 
world famous for his work on children and families.  Kenneth Johnson, then Dean of the 
Columbia School of Social Work, wrote in the Foreword of Kahn’s report that “[i]t gives us facts 
which are not sugarcoated and which are not pleasant to take.”22  The following year, the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York issued a special report, Children and Families in 
the Courts of New York City, written by another Columbian, Professor Walter Gellhorn.23  
Gellhorn incorporated some of Dr. Kahn’s research and insight into his own report and 
recommendations.  Both Dr. Kahn and Professor Gellhorn were at the end of their careers by the 
time I came to Columbia and long past thinking about family court, but I knew them both and 
admired them immensely.  As I’ve worked on a book about family court, of which this talk is 
part of a chapter, I feel their ghosts hovering about my shoulders, urging me along. 
By the time their reports were written, courts for children and families had moved far 
beyond the original juvenile court, addressing various issues of family functioning including 
neglect and abuse, termination of parental rights, and all aspects of domestic relations.  Some 
states continued to separate delinquency from other areas of jurisdiction but many combined 
family issues within specialized courts or court divisions.24  By 1949, the national model 
                                                
19 Id. at 313. 
20 Leonard P. Edwards, Improving Juvenile Dependency Courts, 48 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1997). 
21 Alfred J. Kahn, A COURT FOR CHILDREN (1953). 
22 Id. at vii. 
23 WALTER GELLHORN ET. AL., CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURT OF NEW YORK CITY (1954). 
24 Id. at 27; Khan, supra note 170 at 22. 
Standard Juvenile Court Act recommended that courts for children and families should have 
jurisdiction over all family issues.25  Gellhorn’s report agreed with that recommendation, 
ultimately concluding that New York families would be better served by a unified family court.26  
His recommendation was adopted by a special City Bar Committee and led, in part, to the 
passage of the 1962 New York Family Court Act, which combines most, but not all, family 
proceedings in one unified Family Court.27  
Despite Gellhorn’s strong belief in unifying jurisdiction over family matters in the new 
court, he resisted recommending that the highly successful “school part” of the Children’s Court 
merge into the unified court.  Gellhorn was impressed with the expertise of the four school part 
judges and with the fact that children did not seem to feel stigmatized by attending the school 
part.  He feared that the helping functions that seemed so successful in the school part were not 
sufficiently understood nor implemented by the bench in the rest of the Children’s Court.  
Gellhorn concluded that the school part should remain a separate entity until the community 
supported —and the bench fully embraced—the helping function of the new court that he saw 
exemplified by the judges of the school part.  
 When Gellhorn conducted his study in the early 1950’s, his conclusion that the disjointed 
ways in which child and family problems were parsed out to at least six different courts and 
several divisions of those courts led easily to a conclusion this was not a productive way to get 
the work done.  For Gellhorn, who is credited as one of the creators of modern administrative 
law and who cared deeply that fairness and due process were imbedded into administrative 
processes, a unified Family Court was necessary for that job.  Efficiency was a by-product of his 
conclusions or, as he puts it more artfully, “[t]here is more to this suggestion than a mere 
aesthetic impulse to create an orderly pattern.  It rests on the solid proposition that familial 
controversy can best be handled by judges who specialize in the family.”28   
A comprehensive family court would allow the judge to provide an opportunity for the 
family to address their problems in a constructive (rather than punitive) way while using “skills 
drawn from the social and biological sciences.”29  Staff would be trained in these skills and 
judges would have to be willing to adopt this approach.  Judges should not be assigned to the 
court unless they are “particularly understanding of the methods it must employ” and if 
assignments to the court were to be rotated among judges, they need enough stability to learn this 
methodology and to develop relationships with the other staff.30  
 Gellhorn’s point, throughout the study, is that the many courts that address family issues 
are not set up to do this well.  He also has no doubt that many judges in the courts he reviewed 
are not suited for the unified family court he is proposing.  Gellhorn does not doubt, however, 
that suitable judges can be found and trained to do the work.  He remains optimistic that 
combining the right organizational structure with the right personnel will produce an effective 
court where “modern methods are brought to bear on modern problems.”31  Within ten years, the 
New York State Family Court had been created, shifting most jurisdictional authority over 
family issues into one unified court system.  The Family Court Act also addressed what Gellhorn 
had earlier proposed: “that legal training and experience should be required before any person 
                                                
25 Id. at 27; NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, A STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT (1949). 
26 Gellhorn, supra note 172 at 390. 
27 Id. at 12-16; Family Court Act of 1962 §115, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §115 (McKinney 2012). 
28 Gellhorn, supra note 172 at 382. 
29 Id. at 384. 
30 Id. at 388. 
31 Id. at 390. 
may assume the office of family court judge… [and] Judges of the family court should also be 
familiar with areas of learning and practice that often are not supplied by the practice of law.”32  
Like the judges of the Children’s Court school part, judges so trained would be the judicial 
leaders that Gellhorn envisioned for the new court.  Gellhorn was very careful to minimize his 
concerns about the quality of the judges he was observing in his report.  He needed all the allies 
he could get for his ultimate unification recommendations.  His goal was to change the structure 
of the system and, by doing so, he believed he would also change the quality of the judiciary.  
Modern interdisciplinary education and better organization would make better judges.  
 Dr. Kahn, the social scientist, was less convinced that structural change was the main 
impediment to an effective family court judge.  He certainly agreed that judges with specialized 
knowledge in a better-structured and resourced court would do a better job.  Kahn could not 
avert his eyes, however, from how judges use the jurisdictional authority that they’ve been given.  
His core concern is that “in too many instances, consciously or by implication” many Children’s 
Court judges “see themselves as the Court.”33  Moreover, the litigants see the judge as the Court: 
“For the majority of parents and children, the significance of the entire court is largely decided 
on the bench.” 34 
  Kahn wants to hold onto the idea of the juvenile court, but he portends Justice Fortas’ 
concerns in Gault about the lack of due process by more than a decade.35  Kahn believed that the 
judge lacks the legitimacy to enter into the dispositional phase of a proceeding unless the 
adjudicative phase incorporates the basic due process protections of a common law court.  
Informality has its place in making families more comfortable in the court and in integrating the 
opinions of the social service or mental health experts involved, but informality is not a 
substitute for fairness at either the adjudicative or dispositional phases of hearings; nor is the 
judge’s innate sense of what to do.  As Kahn bluntly writes: “Judges are prone to a major 
occupational hazard – the feeling that they can readily appraise a situation and regularly make 
wise decisions not subject to question.”36  A court with few lawyers, press oversight or regular 
appellate review “lends itself particularly to such hazards.” 37  Kahn finds these hazards 
throughout his study: he recounts stories of judges chiding children for bad spelling; for not 
going to church or learning the Ten Commandments; of chastising parents for their clothes or 
demeanor; and for issuing orders that will change peoples’ lives without ever looking up from 
the bench.  One story recounts the judge calling a young boy into the courtroom to introduce him 
for the first time to his putative father and then sending him home to live with him!  These 
stories don’t include the various punishments judges regularly meted out to their young 
charges.38 Kahn recognizes these occupational hazards and urges restraint on the use of the 
court’s power: 
 
It is clear that, even within a juvenile court concerned with 
arranging treatment, the process which considers intervention 
(judicial steps) must be carefully separated procedurally from 
                                                
32 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §141 (McKinney 2012). 
33 Kahn, supra note 170 at 269. 
34 Id. at 98. 
35 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 
36 Id. at 115. 
37 Id. That these changes have not resulted in a significantly improved system is for other chapters. 
38 Id. at 98-123. 
treatment planning (disposition) since the court properly should 
assert jurisdiction only in clearly defined situations and not simply 
because a judge considers a particular child to need treatment.39  
 
The judge who is given the power to exercise such instrumental authority must understand the 
grave implications of that power in order to make wise findings and proper dispositional orders.  
Kahn wants the judge to be the leader of the court team that Judge Edwards described in his 2004 
speech, but most of the judges he observes don’t define their roles in ways “consistent with the 
intent of the law” or “fail to implement [the law] successfully.”40  He reluctantly concludes, 
“[from] the perspective of the aspirations of the juvenile court movement and the expressed goals 
of court leadership, the accomplishments are outweighed by the inadequacies.”41  
Kahn was not alone in his assessment.  A few years after Kahn’s New York study was 
published, the fiftieth anniversary of the juvenile court was commemorated by a conference at 
the University of Chicago in 1959 and resulted in a book of essays on the court called Justice for 
the Child. Margaret Keeney Rosenheim, a professor and Dean at Chicago’s School of Social 
Services Administration, wrote in her essay contribution that throughout the country, the first 
few judges to occupy the juvenile court bench were men of outstanding reputation whose 
prestige enhanced the work of the court staff and guaranteed community interest and support for 
the new institution.  Yet within two decades of its establishment, this promising institution had 
become the victim of criticism and attacks that have, in substance, continued to the present.42   
Whether those original judges were as outstanding as Professor Rosenheim reminisces a 
half-century on, by the middle of the 20th century the original juvenile court was not fulfilling its 
founders’ aspirations, in large part because of its reliance on a flawed system of judicial 
leadership.  This leads us inevitably toward the question I pose today.  If every family court 
judge can’t be Julian Mack, Len Edwards or the four judges in the school part that Walter 
Gellhorn so admired, what does it mean for judicial leadership to continue to motivate the 
juvenile court, the family court and the unified family court movement?  How can this serve as 
the foundation of the new problem solving court movement?  Why do I recommend caution? 
I begin to answer this question with Kahn’s conclusion that the family court judge must 
have a clearly defined basis for legal intervention in family life prior to ever asserting authority 
over the dispositional phase of a proceeding, something Kahn calls treatment planning.  In other 
words, I start with where we draw the jurisdictional line before a judge can intervene in a 
family’s life.  Let’s use status offenses, also called unruly children in Tennessee, as an example.  
These acts are called status offenses because only minors, not adults, can be held responsible for 
being incorrigible, running away, being truant, not listening to parents or other authorities, using 
drugs, or getting drunk; what Professor Rosenheim called in the 1970’s “juvenile nuisances”.43   
Today, the youth are called CHINS, PINS or JINS; children, juveniles or persons in need 
of supervision.  There has always been significant disagreement about whether the jurisdictional 
line should be drawn at actual criminal acts or for acts that just really bother or worry us.  
Bringing a youth to court for robbery or assault is very different than bringing her to court for 
                                                
39 Id. at 277. 
40 Id. at 106. 
41 Id. at 273. 
42 Rosenheim, JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD, THE JUVENILE COURT IN TRANSITION 10 (1962). 
43 See generally, MARGARET K. ROSENHEIM, PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD (Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) 
(summarizing Ch. 3: Notes on Helping Juvenile Nuisances). 
having sex or underage drinking.  States have drawn that line differently at different points in 
their histories.  Where the line is drawn affects when the court is going to begin impacting the 
life of the child or family.  
States also distinguish among acts that may constitute neglect, abuse, or a sufficient basis 
to terminate parental rights.  These political and cultural choices are tempered by constitutional 
mandates protecting individual liberty and family integrity.  The United States Constitution 
prohibits states from intervening in family life without establishing that a family is unable to 
protect a child from harm, neglect, abuse, or trouble.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that parents have fundamental rights in raising their children, most recently declaring, “[I]t 
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the 
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their 
children."44  Unless a legally defined harm can be established or a person voluntarily seeks the 
assistance of the court, there is no authority for the judge to intervene in the family’s life because 
she believes she can make that family better.  
The late Judge Robert W. Page, a New Jersey Family Court judge who worked tirelessly 
for effective family court reform, succinctly described the court’s legal basis to intervene in a 
comprehensive unified family court plan: 
A court derives its very existence and the validity of its orders 
from an initial determination of a legal basis to act. This is true 
regardless of the substantial needs of those who are affected most 
by the decision. A good rule of thumb is the more substantial the 
need for judicial involvement, the more the need to be substantial 
in finding the legal basis. A legal basis includes the findings of 
jurisdiction and venue at the onset, full respect of the rights of due 
process, with reasonable notice and an opportunity for all to be 
heard and adherence to all statutes, court rules, case precedents and 
established legal and equitable principles. The family court is no 
place for either judicial scofflaws or goodwill ambassadors without 
portfolio.45 
 
Once a legal basis is established and supported by sufficient evidence that a youth 
committed a crime or that a parent abused a child, the judge is then empowered to assert the 
broad “treatment planning” powers to administer so-called “individualized justice,” or 
determining what is best for a child or a family.  When Judge Baker said in 1910, “The court 
does not confine its attention to just the particular offense which brought the child to its notice,” 
he was lauding the court’s ability to fix whatever is wrong with the child or his family beyond 
the child’s misbehavior. 46  Today, judges retain significant dispositional discretion, even if not 
the same unlimited authority used by Judge Baker. Constitutional protections and statutory 
requirements limit the freewheeling authority of earlier generations of the court.  Nevertheless, 
within those limitations, the judge retains tremendous authority to craft services and dispositions.  
How the judge exercises that authority often defines the court and the role it takes in family life.  
                                                
44 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
45 Hon. Gerald W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective, 9 U.C. 
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 57, 84-85 (2005). 
46  HARVEY HUMPHREY BAKER, UPBUILDER OF THE JUVENILE COURT 114 (1910). 
Most states have created some type of family court as either a separate court or a division 
of a trial court.  The jurisdictional authority granted to these courts, however, continues to vary 
considerably.  Some have comprehensive jurisdiction over a broad range of family law matters 
and are able to consolidate cases about the same family under one judge or one “team” of court 
personnel that includes the judge.47  The administrative impetus for consolidating cases is to 
make the court more efficient by providing a judicial forum with broad jurisdiction that 
centralizes court activities and minimizes the need for litigants to appear in multiple proceedings 
in multiple fora about the same or overlapping issues.  The most obvious example is that divorce, 
custody, support and maintenance issues should be heard in the same court, preferably by the 
same judge, with all the judicial officers having access to the same information.  
A less clear-cut instance of the need for “one family/one judge” is when a youth is being 
charged with delinquency and his mother has brought a domestic violence case against her 
partner.  There may be information relevant to whether the judge paroles the youth, such as 
whether the mother can supervise the youth.  On the other hand, the judge might use that 
information to justify detaining the youth because he doesn’t want the youth to witness domestic 
violence or live in a home with a lesbian mother and her partner, two reasons for taking away the 
youth’s liberty that may be irrelevant to the issue of parole.  
This administrative impulse for efficiency through unification, seen half a century earlier 
in Professor Gellhorn’s report, has been attributed to Roscoe Pound’s controversial call for 
consolidation of trials within a unified trial court in 1906.48  Pound, the legendary Dean of 
Harvard Law School, was pursuing efficiency and conserving resources for an inefficient court 
system.  Late in his life, in 1959, Pound applied those same justifications to the family court, 
hoping to eliminate what he called “the waste of time, energy and money” in addressing multiple 
family issues in a multitude of judicial and administrative settings.49  Pound leaves to others 
“what that court should be or may be, or do,” while he focuses more on the court within his 
broader goal of eliminating multiple tribunals as part of modern court organization.50  Pound, 
nevertheless, sees this court as shouldering some of the work previously done by other social 
organizations, like the church, in deterring bad behavior and encouraging civilized society in an 
increasingly heterogeneous and urban landscape.51  
In leaving to others “what that court should be or may be, or do,” Pound sidesteps the 
second impulse of court unification, the therapeutic role of the court “to make the emotional life 
of families and children better.”52  This is the impulse of judicial leadership that I have cautioned 
against.  In the current unification movement, the therapeutic role of the court is manifested in 
two ways: whether services to litigants are provided within or by the court and in what way does 
the judge participate in creating or monitoring the impact of any therapeutic intervention.  
As part of the court’s statutory responsibilities in a large array of cases, the judge issues 
orders that include requiring family members to seek or secure assistance to address the 
problems that allegedly led to court intervention.  These requirements could come at the very 
beginning of a case, when the court sets conditions for a youth’s parole after being charged with 
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delinquency; conditions for unsupervised visits when a child is removed from a parent charged 
with neglect, or limitations on access to the family home after allegations of domestic violence.  
A youth could also be ordered to attend an afterschool program as a condition of parole, a parent 
may be required to comply with drug screening to be permitted visitation, or a spouse may be 
precluded from the home without a third party present.  The court may also be statutorily 
mandated to send disputing parties to mediation or other dispute resolution mechanisms prior to 
adjudicating a custody case.  
The scope of the court’s power to order the litigants to comply with these types of 
behavioral requirements increases dramatically once the court determines that a youth is guilty, a 
parent has been neglectful, or domestic violence has occurred.  Dispositional orders in these 
cases could include probation, secure residential placement, foster care, substance abuse or 
psychiatric treatment, or anger management therapy.  While some of these services can only be 
provided by specialized agencies, many, like substance abuse treatment or testing, parent training 
or education, mediation or case conferencing, are services that could be provided in-house by 
court-related or court-directed service systems.  
From the very beginning, many of the juvenile court’s founders wanted the youth to 
receive whatever help they needed at the courthouse itself.  Probation officers or social workers 
who were part of the court staff would provide supervision or counseling or other assistance 
directly to the young person.53  Some court reformers were uncomfortable with courts being 
service providers, urging instead a clearer line between the judge’s authority to order a service 
and the provision of that service by an executive branch agency or an independent provider.54  
Recent calls for a unified family court include centralizing services within the court 
again, minimizing concern about blurring the boundaries between the court’s power to order a 
disposition and the subsequent implementation of that order.55  Instead, the proponents focus on 
reducing multiple locations or service providers for families and on developing a more holistic 
approach to the families’ needs under the court’s auspices.56   
There are many concerns with the revived model of court-based services.  First, there is 
the traditional objection that a court is not a social services agency and should not act as one.  
The judge’s role is to make the determination that a service is necessary by considering the 
evidence presented.  If the judge determines the service needs to be ordered, it should be.  What 
happens if the service is part of the court itself and then there is a dispute over whether the youth 
or parent has complied with the service or the service provider has delivered the service?  If the 
service provider is part of the court system the court may be unable to impartially resolve the 
dispute.  This is not theoretical. 
Professor Melissa Breger has persuasively applied the social psychology concept of 
“groupthink” to family court practice.  Breger notes that  “[g]roupthink may be defined as ‘a 
mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, 
when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise 
alternative courses of action.’”57  
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Courts, like all institutions, have a culture; a way of doing things that often separates 
insiders from outsiders.58  An extensive study of criminal courts, found, “all [criminal] courts 
have the same work to do in guaranteeing justice and liberty, but they organize themselves 
differently to accomplish these goals depending on their culture.59  Building on the criminal 
courts study, Professor Breger considers how the culture of family court is especially conducive 
to groupthink mentality.  
 The family court’s traditional informality and collegiality, the presence of the same 
institutional players interacting over long periods of time, and the crisis nature of so many of its 
cases, can undermine the independence of the various players in the court system.  There is 
tremendous pressure to reach consensus, not to rock the boat by challenging court norms, and, 
especially, to keep the judge happy.60    Breger identifies that, “Groups have a predilection to 
achieve uniformity, which is often embedded in members’ subconscious. This desire for 
uniformity is specifically manifested in the context of a leader who exerts subtle pressure on the 
group to achieve consensus.  In the family court context, this leader is the judge.”61  
Breger’s conclusions are directly applicable to the question of whether service providers 
should be part of the court system or independent.  As part of the court system, these providers 
interact routinely with court staff and the judge.  They learn the “rules” of the court, the way 
things are supposed to work, and may be reluctant to challenge the status quo.  Court-based 
service providers may be more compliant with the court’s view of a family than they would if 
they were establishing an independent relationship.  Their opinion about a youth or a parent may 
be given greater weight with less supporting evidence by a judge who “trusts” the provider she 
sees everyday and who knows what matters to the judge.  This in turn may reinforce a bias 
against an independent service provider’s opinion when another opinion is sought.62   
Outsiders, even those trying to help the judge make a good decision, may be more loyal 
to their independent professional obligations toward the litigant than an insider.  They may also 
have a different experience with the client outside of court, where the client may be more 
comfortable and less anxious.  This leads to the second reason for separating services from the 
court, a litigant’s reluctance to engage in services closely aligned to the court.  
Court reformers who want to situate services within the court rarely consider the negative 
impact this may have on the way family members accept help.  Little attention is paid to how 
family members may feel about the court generally and, specifically here, securing services 
within the court system.  The proponents of the unified family court believe the court serves as a 
place for families to get help.  I do not.  People come to the family court either because they have 
to, such as when the state charges a youth with a crime or a parent with mistreating his children 
or not paying child support, or because the court is the only or last remaining place to address 
their unresolved custody, visitation, domestic violence, or paternity issues.  If these families 
could resolve disputes themselves or receive readily available and appropriately crafted 
assistance in their communities, they would come to court only when they needed a legal 
judgment.  This is because courts, even family courts, are essentially coercive institutions.  
Writing about the family court unification movement in 2002, Professor Wallace Mylniec 
and Anne Geraghty bluntly summarized their concern: 
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A court is, at its core, an instrument of social control. What it does 
best is resolve disputed factual issues at a point when the litigants 
cannot resolve them by themselves. Courts gain control over these 
acrimonious situations only through the threat or reality of 
coercion. Thus, courts are generally seen as an option of last resort, 
somewhere for people to go to resolve serious disputes without 
resort to violence, and a place where society can assert its control 
over behavior that it considers too egregious to go unpunished. 
Most people who appear before a court do not wish to be there, and 
would have chosen another form of dispute resolution had it been 
possible.63 
 
Mylniec and Geraghty focus on the fact that most litigants in family court are indigent and do not 
view the process as consensual.  These litigants understand, instead, that if they do not comply 
with court-ordered services,, the court can apply even more coercive sanctions, including fewer 
visits with their children, loss of custody, or even jail time.  
When Judge Baker waxed eloquent about the medical metaphor of the juvenile court in 
1910, he nevertheless acknowledged that court-ordered services had a punitive component that 
“affords in some cases an indispensible stimulus or moral tonic….”64 Kahn acknowledged that 
an improved court incorporating legal safeguards would still be “a refined instrument of social 
control and treatment…”65  My colleague, Professor Philip Genty, has written about the need for 
lawyers to empathize with indigent clients’ fear of the legal system.  This empathy requires “an 
understanding of the client’s deep fear and mistrust of the very legal system upon which the 
client must rely for a solution to her or his legal problem.”66  This mistrust does not arise in a 
vacuum.  
Most parents and youth begin the court process in communities deeply suspicious of 
government intervention.  When services are in the courthouse, most litigants may find it very 
difficult to distinguish between the power of the judge to order their compliance with services 
and the court-related service provider trying to engage the litigant with the service.  When the 
service provider is so closely aligned to the judge, can a parent say to the provider that she thinks 
the judge’s decision was wrong?  Will she admit to using drugs even though she has clean urine 
tests?  That she’s angry with her child for reporting her to child protective services?  That she 
thinks mediation is a waste of time?  The litigant may or may not want to receive help.  Yet, if 
she does not work with the provider, what is the likelihood that the parent will get her children 
back, her support reinstated, or her order of protection renewed?  In short, how else could the 
parent get or keep the judge on her side?  
While no court-ordered service is voluntary, a parent may still feel she has more privacy 
to discuss these issues with a service provider outside the court system, maybe even someone she 
chose, or who may work in her community and may be willing to assist her long after the court 
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case is done.  She may feel that she has some say about what is reported back to the court by a 
treatment provider who is not part of “the system.”  Or, as Kahn noted in 1953, “[C]hildren and 
parents can better accept social services from other agencies than from courts which have called 
them in on petition.”67 
These two concerns about court-based services, along with others, raise serious issues 
about the experiences of litigants that court reformers have mostly ignored.  In the end, these 
concerns are only a structural manifestation of the more fundamental question facing unified 
courts: how the therapeutic impulse defines the role of the judge.  When we look at that impulse 
what we find is that the medical model of the early 20th century juvenile court is transforming 
into the therapeutic jurisprudence model of the early 21st with all its attendant dangers. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence, according to its adherents, “looks at law as a social force that, 
like it or not, may produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.”68  The way a law is 
written or a court is organized or a judge acts impacts the well being of the persons involved.  
The proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence want to raise awareness of the legal system’s 
potential for good or harm as a system and encourage reform efforts that strive to minimize the 
negative experiences individuals have when they find themselves immersed in legal processes.  
They want to add therapeutic considerations into the mix of other important considerations about 
legal processes including “autonomy, integrity of the fact-finding process, and community 
safety.”69  In the family law context, “therapeutic justice should strive to protect families and 
children from present and future harms, to reduce emotional turmoil, to promote family harmony 
or preservation, and to provide individualized and efficient, effective family justice.”70  Creating 
a unified family court will accomplish that goal.  The words of the leading proponents of the 
movement are unequivocal on that point:   
 
Rather, it is that we seem to be onto something good for children 
and families, something that helps people secure basic necessities 
and leaves them with the tools necessary to do so long into their 
respective futures. This something is a unified family court, the 
underlying principle of which is the practice of therapeutic justice. 
Therapeutic justice concentrates on empowering families with 
skills development, assisting them in resolving their own disputes, 
enhancing coordination of court events within the justice system, 
providing direct services to families when and where they need 
them, and building a system of dispute resolution that is more cost 
efficient, user-friendly, and time conscious.71 
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I have advocated that UFCs embrace the notions of 
therapeutic jurisprudence and an ecological, holistic approach to 
the family’s problems. In that vein, I have advocated that specially 
trained and interested judges address not only the legal issues, such 
as divorce, custody, child support, and domestic violence, but also 
that they consider the family’s nonlegal needs, such as substance 
abuse, mental health issues, or domestic abuse. A therapeutic and 
ecological UFC model allows for the resolution of legal, personal, 
emotional, and social disputes with the aim of improving the well-
being and functioning of families and children.72 
 
A UFC has an additional and vital goal beyond simple, 
efficient umpiring: to make the emotional life of families and 
children better…The UFC is based on the premise that family 
members are interconnected emotionally, economically, and 
spiritually. Any court order about one family member is likely to 
affect all. Whatever behavioral, mental-health problems, or conflict 
that brought one family member to court is likely caused or 
influenced by other family members. The legal label attached to 
the case is less important to the delivery of therapeutic justice than 
the ability of the court to make appropriate orders to address the 
underlying dynamics causing the family to come to the court's 
attention in the first place.73 
 
These three descriptions have in common several therapeutic components: the court is 
capable of intervening in a family’s life not just to resolve the legal dispute that brought the 
family to court but to improve the family’s life by addressing the complex social, emotional or 
psychological issues underlying the dispute; when therapeutic courts intervene in the lives of 
families, the outcomes for the families will improve; and, most centrally, the court is a good 
place to resolve family problems.  These basic tenets of the unified family court sound 
remarkably like the therapeutic justifications for the original juvenile court.  Our brief historical 
review of judicial leadership in the juvenile and family court systems, however, has never found 
these therapeutic attempts to be successful on a systemic level.  Of course, a particular judge or a 
particular program may work well for a while, such as those school part judges in New York in 
the 1950’s or Judges Mack or Edwards, because they are being run by exceptional, committed 
judges and have received additional funding and other resources.  The few investigations into 
how unified courts are working now, however, only show that there are some administrative 
improvements in the way the court works or some improved outcomes from consolidation of 
court cases, not that a therapeutic approach is effective.74  
This matters for fundamental reasons.  Choosing to create a court based on therapeutic 
principles means that other principles, such as fairness or due process, may be given less value., 
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A judge being asked to help solve a family’s problems may be less concerned about each litigant 
having legal counsel or following strict evidentiary standards or even reaching a decision based 
on the evidence.75  In considering the role of therapeutic jurisprudence in family court, Judge 
Gerald W. Hardcastle recently wrote:  
 
Therapeutic justice implies the court system will not only resolve 
litigants’ disputes but also will resolve the underlying dysfunctions 
existing in the litigants and the families. It also implies the judges 
know the “right” answer. As a result, the process is not about 
judicial discretion. In complex social relationships, the judge is 
charged with finding the right answers and accepts responsibility 
for finding those answers - keeping the parties before the court 
until answers are found. It is an arrogant, ambitious task.76 
 
Moreover, it is a task that puts at risk the trust that litigants try to have in a fair process.  Shifting 
from a neutral judge to a “’healer’ or ‘participant in the process’ or a ‘sensitive, emphatic 
counselor,’” can undermine a litigant’s understanding of the way a court should operate and a 
judge should act.77  A family court judge should be empathetic and respectful, requiring 
everyone in the courthouse to treat litigants considerately.  Civility and respect have, as their end 
goals, a fair and timely process even if the outcome does not satisfy everyone.  As Judge 
Hardcastle points out, the promise that a court can solve problems is essentially a lie.78  
Most litigants in family court have complex family issues and are in desperate need of 
basic human services that might make a difference: employment, decent education and health 
care, child care and mental health treatment, good housing and safe neighborhoods.  Family 
court judges cannot provide for those complex needs even if they wish they could.  As Kahn 
pointed out in 1953, “In reviewing the Court’s total performance it must be recalled that its task 
is exceedingly difficult and that many people come to it because of the failings or lacks in other 
agencies in the community…The basic fact which remains, however, is that many children and 
parents known to the Court require a complex range of services and facilities, but only a minority 
are well served.”79  Myleniec and Gerraghty repeated this “basic fact” fifty years later when they 
warned that a unified family court cannot solve family problems:  
 
Unified family courts by themselves cannot stem the increase in 
caseloads. They can have no effect on the life chances of the 
litigants prior to the time a case is filed. Nor will families face 
fewer complex problems just because court process and 
jurisdiction have been unified and the court becomes more 
efficient. Poor education, dwindling housing stock, mental illness, 
drug use, crime, and crumbling neighborhoods are all beyond the 
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reach of the court. Nor can a court force the executive and 
legislative branches of government to create more and better 
services.80 
 
Abandoning the therapeutic impulse to solve family problems and improve family well-
being does not mean divesting the court of its adjudicative and dispositional responsibilities.  It 
means rethinking them. Juvenile and family court judges have very difficult jobs.  They see 
thousands of litigants each year.  These litigants are usually the least favored among us, the 
poorest and the most fragile.  They are disproportionately people of color.   
The court cannot solve the problems that bring them there.  What the court can do is 
make the best and fairest decision possible with the resources available.  Instead of all the words 
used by judges who want to have some other job, the litigants have a right to expect an impartial 
decision-maker, who will listen to the evidence and make a reasoned decision.  Processes like 
hearings and settlement conferences, slow our thinking down and require us to be more 
deliberative.  This is not an easy thing to do.  We know from the newest mind sciences that we’re 
not the rational beings we thought we were.  We know that judges, like the rest of us, are subject 
to cognitive biases, but cognitive biases can be challenged by trial procedures subject to 
accountability standards, open courts and appellate review.  They are difficult to challenge in a 
court where, as Judge Cindy Lederman says, “I’m not sitting back and watching the parties and 
making a ruling.  I’m making comments.  I’m encouraging. I’m making judgment calls.  I’m 
getting very involved with families.  I’m making clinical therapeutic decisions to some extent, 
with the advice of experts.”81  
My plea is that Judge Lederman, and those like her, be cautious, learn the lessons of 
history, mark the words of Judge Hardcastle that therapeutic justice is an arrogant task, and 
return to the humbler but nobler job of being a judge.  
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